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Abstract. This studies aims to observe the development of literature on company 
investment decisions and to decide what research should be conducted further on 
company investment decisions in the theoretical framework of agency theory. The 
methods used were bibliometric network analysis and literature review. This study has 
mapped out the literature on company investment decisions based on agency theory. 
This study shows that the topics on competition research, corporate governance, and 
capital structure are closely related to the company investment decisions in the theory of 
agency, and it is worth investigating. Therefore, it is necessary to develop further 
empirical research related to company investment decisions in the framework related to 
agency theory by analyzing the influences of competition, corporate governance, and 
capital structure comprehensively on invesment decision.   
Keywords: investment decision, bibliometric network analysis, capital structure, 
corporate governance, competition    
Abstrak. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk observasi pengembangan literatur pada 
keputusan investasi perusahaan dan dapat menentukan penelitian yang harus dilakukan 
selanjutnya mengenai keputusan investasi perusahaan dalam kerangka teori keagenan. 
Metode yang digunakan kali ini ialah bibliometric network analysis dan kajian literatur. 
Penelitian ini telah memetakan literatur mengenai keputusan investasi perusahaan. 
Kajian ini menunjukan bahwa topik penelitian persaingan, tata kelola perusahaan, dan 
struktur modal berkaitan erat terhadap keputusan investasi perusahaan dalam teori 
keagenan, dan layak untuk di teliti lebih lanjut. Oleh karena itu perlu dikembangkan 
penelitian empiris lebih lanjut terkait keputusan investasi perusahaan dalam kerangka 
terkait teori keagenan dengan menganalisis terkait pengaruh pengaruh persaingan, tata 
kelola perusahaan, dan struktur modal secara komprehensif. 
Kata kunci: keputusan investasi, bibliometric network analysis, struktur modal, tata 
kelola perusahaan, persaingan 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Decisions making regarding the utilizations of funds owned by a company, 
there are some differences in interests among the managers, employees, shareholder, 
and debtholder; similarly, the same thing happens when a corporate or a company will 
take investment decisions. On the other hand, investment decisions are important for 
the company in maintaining its sustainability and in growing its business. Investment 
decisions are important because they are related to the profitability that the company 
will earn, and this will even give impacts on the company value supported by Karuna 
(2007), Laksmana and Yang (2015), and Akdogu and MacKay (2012) who state that 
investment decisions can maximize the company value.  
  In addition, according to Gilbert and Lieberman (1987), investment would 
reduce the possibility of the competitor to expand, but temporarily it is influential. In 
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the development of studies related investment decisions has a close relationship with 
agency theory. This is because the agency theory is established based on the seven 
basic assumptions of personal interests, goal conflicts, restricted rationality, 
information asymmetry, efficiency excellence, risk aversion, and information as a 
commodity (Eisenhardt 1989). The studies which were concerned with the relationship 
between agency and the company investment decisions include Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Jensen (1986) and Fazzari et al., (1988) who argue that the problem of 
information asymmetry between management and financial institutions and agency 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors and between 
management and shareholders have been proved to significantly affect company 
investment decisions. Meanwhile, according to Aivazian (2005), agency problems arise 
from the interaction among shareholders, debt-holders, and management. 
  According to Davis et al., (1997), there are various mechanisms of agency 
theory in order to protect the interests of shareholders, minimize agency costs and 
ensure alignment interests. Jesen (1983) outlines two forms of agency theory that have 
been developed, namely, positivist and principal-agent. Positivist researchers have 
emphasized on governance mechanisms, especially in large corporations to identify 
agency issues and governance mechanisms that address agency problems. Eisenhardt 
(1989) states that positivist researchers have focused exclusively on special cases of 
principal-agent relationships between owners and managers of public companies. 
Meanwhile, the principal-agent research approach is a more general approach of agency 
theory where it explores the relationship between two parties such as workers and 
employers; legal consultants and their clients, and buyers and sellers. The principal-
agent flow focuses on the technical and mathematical relationships of the specific 
details of contracts among the principal-agents. In other words, the focus of the 
principal-agent is to determine the optimal contract (Eisenhardt 1989). Positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) proposes three hypotheses i.e. bonus 
plan hypothesis, debt/equity hypothesis, and political cost hypothesis which implicitly 
recognize three agency forms i.e. between owner and management, between creditor 
and management, and between government and management. Therefore, broadly 
speaking, the principal is not only the owner of the company, but it can also be a 
shareholder, creditor, or government. 
  The agency problem was initially explored by Ross (1973), while the detailed 
theoretical exploration of agency theory was first expressed by Jensen and Mecking 
(1976) stating that the manager of a company is the "agent" and the principal is the 
“shareholder”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the agency relationship in agency 
theory that a company is a nexus of contract between the owner of the economic 
resources (principal) and the manager who takes care of the utilization and controls the 
resources. According to Messier et al., (2006), this agency relationship results in two 
problems: (a) the occurrence of information asymmetry, where management generally 
has more information on the actual financial position and the entity operation position 
of the owner; and (b) the occurrence of a conflict of interest due to inequality of goals, 
where management does not always act in the interests of the owner. In an effort to 
overcome or reduce the agency problem, agency cost which will be borne by both 
principal and agent must be provided. In regard to agency issues, corporate governance, 
which is a concept based on agency theory, is expected to serve as a tool to give 
assurance to investors that they will receive return on the funds they have invested. 
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  Previous study showed that the company investment sensitivity on stock prices 
is determined by the extent to which the company has asymmetric information (Chen et 
al., 2007) and problem agency (Jiang et al., 2011). According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), asymmetric information makes investment decisions inefficient. The study by 
Guariglia and Yang (2015) documented strong evidence of investment inefficiency 
which was explained through a combination of financing constraints and agency 
problems. Two significant conclusions were emerged from this major finding. On the 
one hand, limited access to capital markets has caused many Chinese companies to be 
under-investment. In addition, weak corporate governance structures lead shareholders 
or managers to overinvest their free cash flow in projects with negative NPV. Shin and 
Kim (2002) also found that corporate investment decisions are influenced by the 
company agency cost, and this was supported by the study conducted by Hirt et al., 
(2010). Based on the literature, it can be seen that the company investment decisions 
have relation closeness to the agency theory because in making investment decisions, 
they are inseparable from the conflicts among the stakeholders described in the agency 
theory. 
Problems. There is limited information on the factors that determine investment 
decisions within the framework of agency theory. In addition, various studies show 
inconsistent results due to inefficient market conditions (Mutlu et al., 2016; Young et 
al., 2008; Bruce et al., 2005; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003; Hill 1992), and agency 
theory applies only to the anglo saxon context (Bruce et al., 2005). Hill (1992) who 
considers that in the event of a discrepancy in market conditions ignored by the 
researchers, the paradigm in agency theory should be comprehensively studied. 
In the studies by Mutlu et al., (2016) and Bruce et al., (2005), there was some 
doubt to the application of agency theory on companies that develop in the context of 
non-anglo saxon culture and on companies that are still developing (Young et al., 
2008). In addition, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) state that in an efficient market, 
agency theory will produce inconsistent results. This is in accordance with Hill (1992) 
that states that agency theory works based on the assumption that the market is efficient 
and adjusts for rapid changes. Inconsistent results in agency theory in previous studies 
led to the importance of prior mapping of the obtained literature, which can then be 
further studied. 
Objective. The study aims to see the mapping of literature on research topics related to 
company investment decisions within the framework of agency theory and to find out 
research topics on company investment decisions within the framework of agency 
theory can be further developed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
According Karuna (2007), product market competition of an industry influences 
managerial decisions. One of the managerial decisions is that investment decisions, 
based on Laksmana and Yang (2015) and Alimov (2014) show that competition also 
influences company investment decision. Competition itself is essential for growing a 
business because competition leads to business efficiency (Yi 2014), and Griffith 
(2001) also points out that product market competition plays an important role in 
reducing agency costs. In addition, competition allows companies to optimize the 
performance of their managers toward competitors (Laksmana and Yang 2015). 
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The study by Jiang et al., (2015) found that high investment in high competition 
would increase the value proposition of the company. In addition, the study found a 
positive relationship between product market competition and corporate investment 
using a sample of Chinese manufacturing company in the period of 1999-2010. The 
study by Alimov (2014) also found that key corporate decisions are fundamentally 
influenced by product market competition. Theories and other empirical evidence also 
show that corporate investment decisions are influenced by competitive pressures, and 
competition as a different business cycle affects the amount and stability of the 
company cash flow (Mello and Wang 2012). 
Corporate governance plays an important role in the management of a company 
because it will affect the performance of the company as stated by Byun et al., (2012) 
that internal corporate governance has a positive effect on corporate value, and 
Ammann et al., (2010) also shows that corporate governance will increase the value of 
the company. Similarly, investment decisions cannot be separated from the role of 
corporate governance (Guariglia and Yang 2015). Ammann et al., (2013) indicates that 
corporate governance significantly increases the value of company in non-competitive 
industries only. In addition, the study found that good corporate governance for 
companies in non-competitive industries makes them have more capital expenditures, 
spend less on acquisitions, and tend to diversify. According to Zhou et al., (2016), 
governance of the board of directors has a positive effect on managerial risk taking, 
indicating that board governance will result in higher investment in R & D expenditure 
and lower investment in capital expenditures, not only in the current year but also for 
the following years. 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) found that weak corporate governance in 
competitive industries has lower returns on equity, poorer operating performance, and 
lower corporate value. The researchers also found that weak corporate governance in 
competitive industries is more likely to be targeted by hedge fund activists, suggesting 
that investors are taking action to reduce inefficiency. 
The results of the study by Hu and Liu (2014) show that companies having 
CEOs with more diverse career experiences exhibit less cash flow sensitivity and 
exploit outside funds more, including bank loans and trade credit. Hossain et al., (2000) 
found that the percentage of external directors is positively related to the investment 
opportunities of the company. Bathala and Rao (1995) and Hutchinson (2002) found a 
negative relationship between the proportion of external directors and the company 
growth rate. In contrast, Hossain et al., (2000) found that the percentage of external 
directors is positively related to the investment opportunities of the company. 
Anwar and Sun (2014), Aivazian et al., (2003) examined the impact of financial 
leverage on corporate investment decisions using information in the Canadian public 
companies. The results also show that leverage is negatively related to investment, and 
this negative effect is significantly stronger for companies with low growth 
opportunities compared to those with high growth opportunities.  
Anwar and Sun (2014) argue that an increase in foreign ownership, which refers 
to the level of foreign investment in domestic companies, can affect the leverage of the 
companies. The empirical results show that foreign investment has a negative influence 
and is significant statistically on the leverage of domestic companies in the 
manufacturing sector in China. By subsector, the results show that the impact of foreign 
investment on the leverage of domestic enterprises in China textile industry is negative 
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and significant, and this impact is much stronger than the overall impacts on the 
manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, the impact of foreign investment on leverage of 
domestic enterprises in the subsector of electrical machinery and equipment for the 
manufacturing industry is negative but less than the overall impacts in this type of 
industry. 
 
METHOD 
 
This study used the literature review method on company investment decisions. 
The keyword data, titles and abstracts from 223 literatures obtained from the literature 
search engine were collected, and they were then analyzed using bibliometric network 
analysis. From this analysis, first we obtained some information on overlay 
visualization to see the development of literature obtained, and the next information 
was network visualization used to identify clusters and relationships among the 
research topics. Finally, density visualization was identified to see the density of the 
topics of the literature obtained. The results of bibliometric network analysis serve as a 
reference for a more in-depth literature review of the matters or factors affecting the 
company investment decisions. In the literature review, the selection and classification 
of the literature obtained based on the clusters from the results of the bibliometric 
network analysis was firstly conducted. Furthermore, a review on the research results of 
the study according to the clustering was carried out. Following this, the contradictions 
and differences of research results from the existing literatures were analyzed, and 
finally, the conclusions of the results of the analysis of the existing literature were 
made. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Bibliometric Network Analysis  
This analysis viewed the development of the literature on investment decisions 
within the framework of agency theory using bibliometric network analysis of 223 
literatures. The results obtained are as follows. 
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Figure 1. Overlay Visualization 
Based on Figure 1, it can be seen that from the literature obtained, the research 
topics commonly discussed from 2002 to 2004 included the capital structure, leverage, 
debt, and firm value; on the other hand, from 2004 to 2006, the topics included 
information, risk, corporate investment, and R & D expenditure. Furthermore, from 
2006 to 2008, the research topics covered manager, expenditure, agency cost, agency 
problem, and capital investment, and from 2008 to 2010, they covered shareholder, R 
& D investment, growth, product market competition, competition, profitability, 
ownership structure, agency theory, corporate finance, cash holding, firm performance, 
and corporate governance. 
 
Figure 2. Density Visualization 
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Figure 2 shows the density of an item or topic of a study. The higher the number 
of topics around the point and the higher the weight of the topics surround them, the 
closer the point to the red color. Conversely, the smaller the number of items or topics, 
the lower the weight of the topics surround them, the closer the point to the blue color. 
Based on the density and proximity distance of the topics as shown in Figure 2, it can 
be seen that product market competition and competition have a large density and a 
close distance The topics that have a close distance and large density are corporate 
governance, shareholder, manager and agency cost supported by the topics of agency 
problem, cash holding, and corporate finance whose position is next to the location 
with less density. Furthermore, the larger density and close proximity to most research 
topics include expenditure with capital investment, information, and firm value around 
the area; moreover, risk, debt, and leverage with firm performance around them 
followed by growth with R & D investment, R & D expenditure, and corporate 
investment next to the area; lastly, capital investment with profitability, agency theory 
and ownership structure are located around the area. 
 
Figure 3. Network Visualization 
The figure shows that the research themes of investment, competition, corporate 
governance, capital structure, and agency theory have direct and indirect relevance to 
each other. The theme of investment research is shown by the topics on capital 
investment, corporate investment, expenditure, R & D expenditure, R & D investment, 
and expenditure. Moreover, the theme of competition research is shown by the topics 
on product market and competition. Furthermore, the theme of capital structure 
research is shown with the topic of leverage, capital structure, and debt while the theme 
of corporate governance research is shown by research topics on corporate governance, 
ownership structure, manager, and share holder. Also, the theme of agency research is 
shown by agency theory, agency problem, agency cost, and information. 
Based on Figure 3, there are three major clusters, and the first cluster marked by 
red color includes the research topics on capital investment, corporate investment, 
expenditure, R & D expenditure, R & D investment, growth, information, risk, 
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competition, and product market competition grouped into one cluster. The second 
cluster marked by a blue color includes the research topics on agency theory, agency 
problem, agency cost, corporate governance, manager, and cash holding. The third 
cluster in green color covers research topics on corporate finance, capital structure, 
debt, leverage, profitability, and ownership structure. 
When viewed from Figure 3, research with the theme of competition (product 
market competition and competition) is correlated directly with the topics of capital 
structure, risk, and growth. As for the theme of capital structure (leverage, capital 
structure, and debt), it is directly related to the research topics on product market 
competition, profitability, growth, risk, ownership structure, corporate finance, firm 
performance, information, firm value, expenditure, capital investment, expenditure, R 
& D expenditure, manager, agency cost, agency problem, and agency theory. 
Furthermore, the theme of corporate governance research (corporate governance, 
ownership structure, manager, and shareholder) is directly related to the research topics 
on information, expenditure, R & D expenditure, firm performance, risk, leverage, debt, 
capital structure, cash holding, agency cost, agency Problem, and agency theory. 
From the analysis of bibliometric network analysis, it can be concluded that the 
development of literature starts from the themes of capital structure, investment, agency 
theory, competition to corporate governance. The results of the analysis show that there 
are 3 clusters of capital structure, corporate governance, and investment and 
competition. The results of bibliometric network analysis also show the relevance of 
other research topics with investment decisions. Previous research reinforced the results 
of the bibliometric network analysis which show that investment decisions are 
influenced by factors such as competition (Jiang et al., 2015; Griffith 2001; Alimov 
2014; Flammer 2013; Laksmana and Yang 2015; Cheung 2012; Yi 2014; Fresard and 
Valta 2013; Mello and Wang 2012), corporate governance (Guariglia and Yang 2015; 
Francis et al., 2013), and leverage (Anwar and Sun 2014; Aivazian et al., 2003). (3 
point of views or 3 cluster). From the bibliometric network analysis results supported 
by the existing literature, the next stage will be the literature study on company 
investment decisions from the 3 cluster i.e. cluster 1 product market competition, 
cluster 2 corporate governance, and cluster 3 capital structure.  
Cluster 1. Product Market Competition. Laksmana and Yang (2015) contribute to 
the literature by providing evidence of the role of product market competition in 
disciplining management investment decisions. First, the results show that competition 
encourages managers to invest in risky investments. One potential explanation for this 
result is that competition reduces the opportunity for resource shifting for management 
personal benefits. Another explanation is that the power of competition affects 
management to take on more risks for long-term company survival. Second, these 
results indicate that competition makes management more disciplined on cash usage. 
Overall, research results provide support for corporate governance functions from 
product market competition to corporate investments and show that companies in more 
competitive industries take more risks as measured by capital expenditure, R & D 
expenditure, and standard deviations from stock returns than those in less competitive 
industries. 
According to Chen et al., (2014), product market competition can lower equity 
capital cost, indicating that the agency cost competition will become more efficient. Lin 
et al., (2012) state that increased competition of product market will improve efficiency 
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of banking and financing in labor intensive industries. The research by Jiang et al., 
(2015) also shows that there is a positive relationship between competition of product 
market and corporate investment in a country with a strong and predictable economy 
like China.  
On the contrary, Grullon and Michaely (2008) had somewhat a different study 
from other studies i.e. examining the interaction between product market competition 
and manager decisions to distribute cash to shareholders. The study used the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from the census of producers as a proxy for product 
market competition and used a sample of large manufacturing companies, and it is 
found that companies in less competitive industries have a significantly lower payout 
ratio than those in more competitive markets. Overall, these findings are consistent 
with the idea that the power of competition encourages managers to be disciplined in 
paying for excess cash and with the idea that dividends are the "outcome" of the 
external factors. Moreover, Baggs and Bettignies (2007) state that competition has a 
direct pressure, significant effect, and a significant institutional effect on managerial 
efficiency. These effects make the company understand the importance of quality 
improvement.  
Cheung (2012) investigated how competition in the product market together 
affected corporate investment and financing behavior during the period of 1996-2008. 
The research explained the role of competition in different market structures. The 
results found that higher market product competition generally resulted in higher 
reduction in investment. However, these results do not apply to concentrated industries 
where competition of product market leads to significant investment expenditure. 
Meanwhile, Yi's (2014) study discusses the impact of product market competition on 
the investment efficiency of the company from both sides. First, in terms of corporate 
governance, product market competition facilitates institutional investors in 
disciplining companies, and this makes investment more efficient. However, if it 
focuses on the production information, product market competition reduces the 
company incentive to acquire information. Companies in a competitive industry receive 
different signals on exact demand which leads to less efficient investment. 
Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) study show that product market competition has a 
positive and significant impact on performance. Finally, product market competition 
and good corporate governance tend to reinforce one another instead of being a 
substitute. Competition has no significant impact on performance for companies with 
bad corporate governance; in contrast, it has significant positive impact on companies 
with good corporate governance.  
In general, with the competition, agency problems and agency costs will 
decrease, and this benefits the company because the competition will improve the 
performance of management and corporate governance. However, there is still 
inconsistency from research on product market competition such as the study by 
Cheung (2012) which shows inconsistency in the influence of competition on 
investment, i.e. if market structure is different, it will have a difference influence on 
investment. Furthermore, Laksmana and Yang (2015) argue that competition makes 
management more disciplined on the use of cash, but they also state that competition 
encourages managers to make risky investment decisions. As it is in the study of Yi 
(2004) which shows that competitive industries are less efficient in corporate 
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investment. In addition, lack of competitive research on investment in the framework of 
agency theory in Indonesia makes this necessary to be further studied.  
Cluster 2. Corporate Governance. The study of Chen et al., (2014) that examined the 
level and type of ownership with the allocation of investment funds found that 
ownership of a company has an important role in determining investment behavior of 
the company. Based on the study by Francis et al., (2013), corporate governance is a 
key determinant of investment sensitivity to internal cash flows; in addition, the level 
of corporate governance has a positive effect on access to funding. The results of this 
study support the argument of agency theory which suggests the existence of incentives 
and monitor costs of managerial actions can lead to friction funding and affect the 
behavior of corporate investments. As it is in the research of Shin and Kim (2002), 
company investment decisions are also influenced by agency costs.  
According to Chen et al., (2015), companies that have more concentrated 
shares/stocks have a drive to conduct over-investment while those with higher stock 
trading proportion, board size of supervisors, and leverage will mitigate over-
investment. For underinvestment firms, their evidence shows that firms with higher 
state-ownership concentration, larger board size of directors or higher proportion of 
outside directors are associated with severer under-investment, while firms with higher 
leverage or higher proportion of tradable shares alleviate under-investment.  
According to Chen et al., (2013), foreign institutional shareholdings make a 
difference in the level of asymmetry information, and problem agency makes a 
difference in investment behavior. The shareholdings will mitigate the problem agency 
and asymmetric information by improving corporate governance and transparent 
financial management. The study by Almeida and Dalmacio (2015) investigated how 
interaction between product market competition and corporate governance improves 
analyst accuracy estimates and reduces estimates of deviations. The study used a 
sample of public companies in Brazil. The results show that competitive industries 
provide incentives to improve the flow of information but not necessarily to improve 
quality. However, good corporate governance improves the financial reporting process, 
and consequently, the quality of analyst estimates becomes more accurate. The main 
evidence of the study is that analysts covering companies in competitive industries with 
strong corporate governance are the most accurate ones. Similarly, according to 
Guadalupe and Gonzalez (2010), competition policy can have an important influence 
on corporate governance.  
The contract structure is influenced by the corporate governance. With the 
involvement of foreign investors in ownership, a better management system will be 
created due to the current knowledge and technologies that enter the company 
(Guariglia and Yang 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Shin and Kim 2002). In addition, 
managerial share ownership mechanisms can improve the performance of the company 
and shareholder values (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Morck et al., 1988; Wright et al., 
1996; Lins 2003; Wei et al., 2005). In the agency theory, the option of the offering of 
the managerial shareholding interestingly encourages managers to improve their 
company performances (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).  
According to Connelly et al., (2017), dividend payout initiation is associated 
with stronger governance (stronger positions of the shareholders and independent 
board). The managerial shareholding by the CEOs has a positive relationship with the 
dividend initiation at companies whose governance is highly strong. The study found 
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that when initiation was due to significantly stronger governance, the governance was 
then related to corporate investment opportunities, while for weaker corporate 
governance, the relationship was not observed.  
Based on Chen et al., (2017), the shareholdings of the government and foreign 
institutions are associated with different levels of asymmetric information and problem 
agencies. The studies found strong evidence that government shareholding have 
undermined the sensitivity of investment opportunities, thus increasing investment 
inefficiency. Conversely, the foreign shareholding has strengthened the sensitivity of 
investment opportunities, thereby increasing investment efficiency. In addition, I found 
that the relationship between foreign ownership and investment efficiency is stronger as 
the government relinquished control and the governance level of the government 
institutions is weaker.  
According to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2017), the majority of shareholders and 
the increase in state share ownership have a negative influence on the company 
investment, such as domestic share ownership and financial institutions whereas the 
insider shareholdings and industry and financial groups do not affect investment.  
Based on the existing literature, it can be concluded that in general, corporate 
governance is influential on company investment decisions; however, there are 
differences in the influences due to the level of competition or the structure of market 
competition that makes the governance different. In addition, the existing corporate 
governance studies still have shortcomings as in the study of Connelly et al., (2017), 
who studied the relationship between weak corporate governance and unobserved 
investment decisions. Moreover, there is still inconsistency in terms of influence of 
share ownership on investment decisions as Mykhayliv and Zauner (2017) state that 
insider shareholdings and industrial and financial groups do not influence investment. It 
is, therefore, necessary to further study the influence of corporate governance on more 
specific investment decisions.  
 
Cluster 3. Capital Structure. According to Firth et al., (2012) in addition to 
shareholder, there are also debt holders who will monitor the company performance 
and business decisions of the company including investment decisions due to the 
leverage. The existence of problem agency in the research by Aivazian (2005) is 
"overinvestment" due to conflict between management and shareholders. Managers 
have a tendency to expand in the company scale only and pay less attention to future 
corporate value after investments; moreover, they even take on poor investment 
projects and reduce shareholder wealth. Management ability to implement the policy is 
limited by the availability of cash flow, and this constraint can be further reduced 
through debt financing. By issuing debt, the company has to pay interest and principals 
that put pressure on management not to allocate funds for poor investment projects. 
Similarly, Anwar and Sun (2014), Aivazian et al. (2003), Guney et al., (2011) in their 
studies state that leverage affects investment decisions.  
In order to prevent over-investment and increase control over corporate 
management, capital structure policy is often used. With the interest cost and creditor 
supervision, the company management will be more careful in investing for the 
company (Anwar and Sun 2014, Guney et al., 2011 Aivazian et al., 2003). Guariglia 
and Yang (2015) argue that the limited access to capital markets causes many Chinese 
companies to be under-investment. In addition, weak corporate governance structure 
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leads shareholder managers or controllers to overinvest their free cash flow in projects 
with negative NPV. 
The findings obtained by Moenadin et al., (2013) indicate that there is a 
significant relationship between selected industrial capital structure and product market 
competition. Similarly, the study by Pandey (2004) shows that there is a relationship 
between capital structure and market forces due to the complex interactions of market 
conditions, agency problems and bankruptcy costs. According to Rathinasamy (2000), 
companies that have more monopoly power use longer-term financing and debt. Based 
on the research by Guney et al., (2011), Chinese companies tend to adjust their 
leverage ratios. There is a relationship between the intensity of competition and the 
leverage ratio, which supports the theory of predation.  
According to Munisi (2017) who studied the determinants of capital structure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, capital structure is negatively related to profitability and tangible 
assets, supported by pecking-order theory and trade-off theory. The findings show that 
capital structure is positively associated with free cash and corporate growth, consistent 
with agency theory and pecking-order theory.  
Nevertheless, there are also different study results on agency theory in capital 
structure as in Banga et al., (2017) who state that the determination of capital structure 
in the small-medium scaled businesses in India is influenced by the application of 
pecking order theory and trade off theory, but there is no evidence for the application of 
agency theory. Also, Huang et al., (2016) examined the capital structure of the small-
medium scaled businesses in China, and the results show that leverage is influenced by 
executive shareholders and excess cash compensation. However, institutional share 
ownership does not affect leverage level that is more influenced by traditional factors 
such as taxes and operating cash flows.  
Empirical results from Dawar's (2014) research in India show that leverage has 
a negative effect on the financial performance of Indian companies, which contradicts 
the assumption of agency theory as it is generally accepted in developed and 
developing countries. Consequently, agency theory postulate should be viewed with a 
different perspective in India by considering the nature of bond market and dominance 
of state-owned banks in providing loans to the corporate sector.  
Based on the existing literature, it can be concluded that with leverage, there is a 
conflict among shareholders, management and debtholders that can be seen from the 
agency theory. The sub-sectoral differences, foreign share ownership, and market 
structure will affect the company capital structure, and Pecking order theory and trade 
off theory affect the capital structure. On the contrary, the agency theory on capital 
structure is still inconsistent because a number of studies show that the agency theory is 
not found in determining capital structure.  
 
The implication of research development. According to Hill (1992), there are 
paradigms in analyzing agency theory, namely, corporate strategic behavior; principal-
agent contract structure; monitoring and strengthening of principal-agent contracts, and 
evolutionary processes that alter the structure of the principal-agent contract and the 
institutional structure that issues the contract. From the study, it was found that 
differences from market conditions resulted in inconsistent results, and by analyzing 
them from various paradigms, more comprehensive results in the application of agency 
theory can be obtained. Based on the literature review on investment decisions within 
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the framework of agency theory associated with the topics of product market 
competition research, corporate governance, and capital structure, inconsistent results 
still exist. 
       Therefore, further research is required to provide a more comprehensive 
review related to the company strategic behavior paradigm by using product market 
competition indicators affecting the company environmental conditions (Jiang et al., 
2015; Griffith 2001; Alimov 2014; Flammer 2013; Laksmana and Yang 2015; Cheung 
2012; Yi 2014; Fresard and Valta 2013; Melo and Wang 2012); The principal-agent 
contract structure is indicated by implementation of good corporate governance within 
the company (Guariglia and Yang 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Shin and Kim 2002); and 
the monitoring and strengthening of the principal-agent contract use the capital 
structure policy indicator, and with the existing of the interest cost and debtholders 
supervision, the company management will be more careful in investing the company 
(Anwar and Sun 2014, Guney et al., 2011 Aivazian et al., 2003). From this studies, it is 
expected to provide a study that can provide consistent results in inefficient market 
conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has mapped out the existing literature using bibliometric network 
analysis that can show that the development of literature starts from the themes of 
capital structure, investment, agency theory, competition and corporate governance. 
Then the results of the analysis indicate that there is a linkage of topics directly or 
indirectly, and this analysis shows from the existing literature that there are 3 major 
clusters of capital structure, corporate governance, and competition. 
Based on the existing literature review, the research topics of product market 
competition, corporate governance, and capital structure are research topics that have 
closeness relation to company investment decisions within the agency theory 
framework. The previous studies generally stated that product market competition, 
corporate governance and capital structure affect investment decisions taken by the 
company and can be discussed with the agency theory. However, there are still 
deficiencies and inconsistencies in the results of the previous studies, and there is still 
lack of research on the influence of product market competition, corporate governance, 
and capital structure on corporate investment decisions within the framework of the 
agency theory that was thoroughly studied. Therefore, further empirical studies on the 
impact of product market competition, corporate governance, and capital structure on 
investment decisions in comprehensive agency theory are required.  
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